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Abstract
In this paper, we design robust beamforming to guarantee the physical layer security for a multiuser
beam division multiple access (BDMA) massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system, when
the channel estimation errors are taken into consideration. With the aid of artificial noise (AN), the pro-
posed design are formulated as minimizing the transmit power of the base station (BS), while providing
legal users and the eavesdropper (Eve) with different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). It
is strictly proved that, under BDMA massive MIMO scheme, the initial non-convex optimization can be
equivalently converted to a convex semi-definite programming (SDP) problem and the optimal rank-one
beamforming solutions can be guaranteed. In stead of directly resorting to the convex tool, we make
one step further by deriving the optimal beamforming direction and the optimal beamforming power
allocation in closed-form, which greatly reduces the computational complexity and makes the proposed
design practical for real world applications. Simulation results are then provided to verify the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [1] is one of the key technologies for 5G
wireless communications [2], which utilizes a very large number of antennas at the base station
(BS) to provide low power consumption, high spectral efficiency, security, and reliable linkage. It
was shown in [3] that the propagation channel vectors of different users become asymptotically
orthogonal, where the effects of uncorrelated noise and intra-cell interference will be eliminated
when the number of antennas at the BS grows to infinity. As a result, simple linear signal
processing approaches, i.e., matched filter (MF) and zero-forcing beamforming can be used in
massive MIMO systems [4]. However, a prerequisite of enjoying above benefits is the availability
of channel state information (CSI). There are three main approaches of low-complex channel
estimation algorithms that referred to different expansion basis to represent the sparsity inside
channels [5]–[11]. For example, the authors in [5], [6] applied a low-rank approximation of the
channel covariance matrix to reduce the effective channel parameters of massive MIMO. The
authors in [7]–[9] proposed an angle division multiple access (ADMA) model and the massive
MIMO channels could be represented by a few channel gain and angular parameters. Moreover,
[10], [11] designed a beam division multiple access (BDMA) scheme and a few orthogonal basis
from discrete Fourier transform (DFT) are used to approximate the channel vectors. Nevertheless,
perfect CSI are not available in practice due to: (i) all [5]–[11] are based on approximately-sparse
model and there must be residue errors; (ii) additive noise always exist at the receiver. Therefore,
the channel estimation errors should be taken into consideration in the subsequent transmission
design.
On the other side, secrecy and privacy are also critical concerns for 5G communication
systems, where the physical layer security has drawn considerable interest since it can pre-
vent eavesdropping without upper layer data encryption. The information-theoretic approach to
guarantee secrecy was initiated by Wyner [12], where it was shown that confidential messages
transmission could be achieved by exploiting the physical characteristics of the wireless channel.
Then the results of [12] was generalized to different channel models, i.e., the broadcast channels
[13], the single-input single-output (SISO) fading channels [14], the multiple access channels
(MAC) [15], and the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels [16]. The authors of [17]
3first investigated the limiting physical layer security performance when the number of antennas
approaches infinity in massive MIMO systems, and then [18], [19] studied the physical layer
security in massive MIMO relay channel and massive MIMO Rician Channel, respectively.
The authors of [20]–[22] considered the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate in massive MIMO
systems, where it was shown that under certain orthogonality conditions, the secrecy rate loss
introduced by the eavesdropper could be completely mitigated. However, all [17]–[22] do not take
channel estimation errors into consideration. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the optimal
solution of robust beamforming for the physical layer security of massive MIMO systems has
not been reported yet.
In this paper, we consider robust beamforming for the physical layer security of multiuser mas-
sive MIMO systems following BMDA scheme [10], [11], where the estimated channels are lied
orthogonally to each other and the channel estimation errors are bounded by ball constants. The
proposed design utilizes simultaneous robust information and artificial noise (AN) beamforming
to provide the legal users and Eve with different signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR),
meanwhile minimizing the transmit power of BS. The resulted problem is a well-known NP-
hard [23] optimization, where the computational complexity [24] increases exponentially with
the number of antennas. Consequently, existing robust beamforming algorithms for conventional
communication systems [25]–[28] cannot be applied in massive MIMO systems due to their
forbiddingly huge computational complexity. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that under the BDMA
massive MIMO scheme, the proposed design can be globally solved. More importantly, the
optimal robust beamforming vectors can be derived in closed-form, which will greatly reduce
the computational complexity and is suitable for practical applications. Interestingly, it is shown
that the AN beamforming is not necessary for the proposed robust optimization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the BDMA massive MIMO
channel model and formulates the proposed robust design; Section III converts the initial non-
convex optimization into a convex semi-definite programming (SDP) and proves the optimality
of semi-definite relaxation (SDR); Closed-form solutions for the power allocation problem are
derived in Section IV; Simulation results are provided in Section V and conclusions are drawn
in Section VI.
4Notation: Vectors and matrices are boldface small and capital letters, respectively; The Her-
mitian, inverse and Moore-Penrose inverse of A are denoted by AH, A−1 and A† respectively;
Tr(A) defines the trace; I and 0 represent an identity matrix and an all-zero matrix, respectively,
with appropriate dimensions; A  0 and A ≻ 0 mean that A is positive semi-definite and
positive definite, respectively; The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
(CSCG) random variable with zero mean and variance σ2 is defined as CN (0, σ2), and ∼ means
“distributed as”; Ra×b and Ca×b denote the spaces of a×b matrices with real- and complex-valued
entries, respectively; ‖x‖ is the Euclidean norm of a vector x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Let us consider physical layer security for a multiuser massive MIMO system shown in Fig. 1.
It is assumed that the BS is equipped with N ≫ 1 antennas in the form of uniform linear array
(ULA), where the antenna spacing is less than or equal to half wavelength. There are K legal
users and one Eve randomly distributed in the coverage area, where all the legal users and the
Eve are quipped with single antenna. The channel from the kth user to BS can be expressed as
[5], [9] hk =
∫
θ∈Θk
αk(θ)a(θ)dθ, where Θk is the incoming angular spread of user-k and αk(θ)
is the corresponding spatial power spectrum. Moreover, a(θ) ∈ CN×1 is the steering vector that
can be expressed as a(θ) =
[
1, ej
2πd
λ
sin θ, . . . , ej
2πd
λ
(N−1) sin θ
]H
, where d is the antenna spacing
and λ denotes the signal wavelength. Similarly, the channel from the Eve to BS can be expressed
as he =
∫
θ∈Θe
αe(θ)a(θ)dθ, where Θe is the incoming angular spread of Eve and αe(θ) is the
corresponding spatial power spectrum.
In this paper, we adopt the recently popular low complexity BDMA channel estimation scheme
[10], [11] such that pilots of different users are transmitted through orthogonal spatial directions1,
and the estimated channels for different users must be orthogonal, i.e.,
h˜Hi h˜j = 0, h˜
H
i h˜e = 0, ∀i 6= j, (1)
1In particular, the columns of discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrix with non-overlap indices are assigned to different users
as the training directions. Such a scheme is not optimal in terms of training design but could be implemented with much higher
efficiency. Moreover, as long as N is large, which is the case of massive MIMO, the performance loss of BDMA channel
estimation is small compared to the optimal one.
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Fig. 1. Multiuser massive MIMO channel model in the form of ULA.
Please refer to [10], [11] for detailed discussion of BDMA. We then assume that the real channel
vectors hk and he lie around the estimated channel vectors h˜k and h˜e, respectively, i.e.,
hk ∈ Uk =
{
h˜k + δk | ‖δk‖ ≤ ǫk
}
, he ∈ Ue =
{
h˜e + δe | ‖δe‖ ≤ ǫe
}
(2)
where δk ∈ C
N×1 and δe ∈ C
N×1 are the channel estimation errors whose norms are assumed
to be bounded by ǫk and ǫe respectively.
2
B. Problem Formulation
Let us apply AN at BS during the downlink data transmission to provide the strongest distortion
to Eve, i.e., the baseband signal from BS can be expressed as
xb =
K∑
k=1
skvk +wvw, (3)
where vk ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the data symbol for the kth user; vw ∼ CN (0, 1) is the AN
signal for the Eve; sk ∈ CN×1 and w ∈ CN×1 are information beamforming vector and AN
beamforming vector, respectively.
The downlink signal at the kth user can be expressed as
yk = h
H
k skvk +
∑
i 6=k,i∈K
hHk sivi + h
H
kweve + nk, (4)
2Note that as long as N is not infinity, the real channel hk and he cannot be perfectly orthogonal.
6where nk ∼ CN (0, σ
2
k) represents the antenna noise of the kth user. The downlink signal at the
Eve can be expressed as
ye =
K∑
k=1
hHe skvk + h
H
eweve + ne, (5)
where nk ∼ CN (0, σ2k) represents the antenna noise of the Eve. Then the secret rate for the kth
user are expressed as
Rk = log2

1+ ‖hHk sk‖2∑
i 6=k
‖hHk si‖
2+‖hHkwe‖
2+σ2k

−log2

1+ ‖hHe sk‖2∑
i 6=k
‖hHe si‖
2+‖hHewe‖
2+σ2e


≥ log2 (1 + γk)− log2 (1 + γe,k) , (6)
where γk is the receive SINR for the kth user, and γe,k is the receive SINR for Eve when Eve
aims to eavesdrop the kth user. Note that when γk > γe,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we could
always obtain non-zero secret rate for each users, which implies that the physical layer security
could be strictly guaranteed.
Our target is to design simultaneous information beamforming vectors {sk} and AN beam-
forming vector we to provide legal users and the Eve with different SINRs, meanwhile mini-
mizing the transmit power of BS. Taking the channel estimation errors into consideration, the
robust transmit beamforming design can be formulated as
P1 : min
{sk},we
‖we‖
2 +
K∑
k=1
‖sk‖
2 (7)
s.t.
‖hHe sk‖
2∑
i 6=k
‖hHe si‖
2 + ‖hHewe‖
2 + σ2e
≤ γe,k, he ∈ Ue, (8)
‖hHk sk‖
2∑
i 6=k
‖hHk si‖
2 + ‖hHkwe‖
2 + σ2k
≥ γk, ∀hk ∈ Uk, (9)
k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (10)
where γe,k > 0 is the maximum allowable SINR for Eve, and γk > 0 is the desired SINR for the
kth user. Note that the optimal solutions of P1 are very hard to obtain in conventional MIMO
7systems3. Nevertheless, we will next show that P1 could be globally solved utilizing property
(1) of BDMA massive MIMO systems.
III. OPTIMAL ROBUST BEAMFORMING
A. Problem Reformulation
The main difficulty of solving P1 lies in the constraints (8) and (9). Substituting (2) into (8),
we can equivalently rewrite (8) as

(
h˜e+δe
)H(∑
i 6=k
sis
H
i +wew
H
e −
1
γe,k
sks
H
k
)(
h˜e+δe
)
+σ2e ≥ 0,
−δHe Iδe + ǫ
2
e ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
(11)
Substituting (2) into (9), we can equivalently rewrite (9) as

(
h˜k+δk
)H( 1
γk
sks
H
k −
∑
i 6=k
sis
H
i −wew
H
e
)(
h˜k+δk
)
−σ2k ≥ 0,
−δHk Iδk + ǫ
2
k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
(12)
According to the Lemma of S-Procedure [29], we know that the constraints in (11) hold true
if and only if there exists µe,k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K such that
 Xe,k + µe,kI Xe,kh˜e
h˜HeX
H
e,k h˜
H
eXe,kh˜e + σ
2
e − µe,kǫ
2
e

  0, (13)
where for simplicity, we define Xe,k as
Xe,k =
∑
i 6=k
sis
H
i +wew
H
e −
1
γe,k
sks
H
k . (14)
Meanwhile, the constraints in (12) hold true if and only if there exists µs,k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
such that 
 Xs,k + µs,kI Xs,kh˜k
h˜HkX
H
s,k h˜
H
kXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k

  0, (15)
where for simplicity, we define Xs,k as
Xs,k =
1
γk
sks
H
k −
∑
i 6=k
sis
H
i −wew
H
e . (16)
3The proposed design P1 has been proven to be NP hard in conventional communication systems [27], where it is very
difficult to obtain the optimal beamforming vectors.
8It is then clear that P1 can be equivalently re-expressed as
P1−EQV : min
{µe,k},{µs,k},we,{sk}
Tr(We) +
K∑
k=1
Tr(Sk) (17)
s.t.

 Xe,k + µe,kI Xe,kh˜e
h˜HeX
H
e,k h˜
H
eXe,kh˜e + σ
2
e − µe,kǫ
2
e

  0, (18)

 Xs,k + µs,kI Xs,kh˜k
h˜HkX
H
s,k h˜
H
kXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k

  0, (19)
Xe,k =
∑
i 6=k
Si +We −
1
γe,k
Sk, (20)
Xs,k =
1
γk
Sk −
∑
i 6=k
Si −We, (21)
µe,k ≥ 0, µs,k ≥ 0, (22)
We = wew
H
e , Sk = sks
H
k , k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (23)
where {µe,k} and {µs,k} are the auxiliary variables generated by the S-Procedure. Note that the
nonlinear constraints in (23) are equivalent to:
We  0, Sk  0, Rank(We) = 1, Rank(Sk) = 1. (24)
However, P1−EQV is still very hard to solve since the rank constraint in (23) is non-convex.
Dropping the the rank constraints Rank(We) = 1 and Rank(Sk) = 1 (the SDR technique [30]),
we can obtain the following relaxed convex optimization:
P1−SDR : min
{µe,k},{µs,k},We,{Sk}
Tr(We) +
K∑
k=1
Tr(Sk) (25)
s.t. (18) ∼ (22), (26)
We  0, Sk  0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (27)
which is a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem that can be efficiently solved by the
standard convex optimization tools [23]. However, the SDR technique does not guarantee rank-
one solutions for the relaxed optimization. Nevertheless, we will next show that P1−SDR
indeed guarantees rank-one solutions for BDMA massive MIMO systems, i.e., P1−SDR is
equivalent to P1−EQV.
9B. Optimal Rank-one Solutions
The following propositions will be useful throughout the rest of the paper.
Proposition 1: Suppose {µ⋆e,k} and {µ
⋆
s,k} are the optimal auxiliary variables of P1−SDR.
There must be
(a) µ⋆e,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}; (b) µ
⋆
s,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: Suppose W ⋆e and {S
⋆
k} are the optimal transmit covariances of P1−SDR.
There must be
(a) Rank
(
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}; (b) Rank
(
X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 indicate that the optimal AN and information
transmit covariance could not be full-rank, i.e., Rank (W ⋆e ) < N and Rank (S
⋆
k) < N, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , K}. Moreover, from (B.8) in Appendix B, we know that Rank (W ⋆e ) and Rank (S
⋆
k)
can be further constrained as Rank (W ⋆e ) ≤ K + 1 and Rank (S
⋆
k) ≤ K + 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
From Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we can reformulate P1−SDR to gain more insightful
solutions. Let the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of Xe,k be Xe,k = Ue,kΛe,kU
H
e,k with the
eigenvalues qe,k,1 ≥ . . . ≥ qe,k,N , and the EVD of Xs,k be Xs,k = Us,kΛs,kU
H
s,k with the
eigenvalues qs,k,1 ≥ . . . ≥ qs,k,N . Due to the fact that µe,kI = Ue,k (µe,kI)UHe,k and µs,kI =
Us,k (µs,kI)U
H
s,k, the EVDs of Xe,k + µe,kI and Xs,k + µs,kI can be represented as
Xe,k + µe,kI = Ue,k (Λe,k + µe,kI)U
H
e,k, Xs,k + µs,kI = Us,k (Λs,k + µs,kI)U
H
s,k, (28)
respectively, where Λe,k+µe,kI is diagonal with the eigenvalues qe,k,1+µe,k ≥ . . . ≥ qe,k,N+µe,k
and Λs,k + µs,kI is diagonal with the eigenvalues qs,k,1 + µs,k ≥ . . . ≥ qs,k,N + µs,k. Using
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, it is easily known that qe,k,1 + µe,k > 0 and qs,k,1 + µs,k > 0
hold. Then assuming Rank (Xe,k + µe,kI) = le,k ≥ 1 and Rank (Xs,k + µs,kI) = ls,k ≥ 1, there
are
qe,k,i + µe,k = 0, ∀i ∈ {le,k + 1, . . . , N}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (29)
qs,k,i + µs,k = 0, ∀i ∈ {ls,k + 1, . . . , N}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (30)
10
Define Σe,k,+ and Σs,k,+ as
Σe,k,+ =


qe,k,1 + µe,k 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 qe,k,le,k + µe,k

 ,Σs,k,+ =


qs,k,1 + µs,k 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 qs,k,le,k + µs,k

 ,
respectively. The Moore-Penrose inverses [31] of Xe,k + µe,kI and Xs,k + µs,kI can be derived
as4
(Xe,k + µe,kI)
† = Ue,k

 Σ−1e,k,+ 0
0 0

UHe,k, (Xs,k + µs,kI)† = Us,k

 Σ−1s,k,+ 0
0 0

UHs,k, (31)
respectively. Then we provide the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Generalized Schur’s Complement [32]): Let M =
[
A,B;BH,C
]
be a Hermitian
matrix. Then, M  0 if and only if C − BHA†B  0 and
(
I −AA†
)
B = 0 (assuming
A  0), or A−BC†BH  0 and
(
I −CC†
)
BH = 0 (assuming C  0), where A† and C†
are the generalized inverses of A and C, respectively.
Using Lemma 2, we know that P1−SDR could be equivalently rewritten as
P1−SDR−EQV :
min
{µe,k},{µs,k},We,{Sk}
Tr(We) +
K∑
k=1
Tr(Sk) (32)
s.t. Xe,k + µe,kI  0, Xs,k + µs,kI  0, (33)[
I − (Xe,k + µe,kI) (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
]
Xe,kh˜e = 0, (34)
h˜HeXe,kh˜e + σ
2
e − µe,kǫ
2
e − h˜
H
eX
H
e,k (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
Xe,kh˜e ≥ 0, (35)[
I − (Xs,k + µs,kI) (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
]
Xs,kh˜k = 0, (36)
h˜HkXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k − h˜
H
kX
H
s,k (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
Xs,kh˜k ≥ 0, (37)
Xe,k =
∑
i 6=k
Si +We −
1
γe,k
Sk, (38)
Xs,k =
1
γk
Sk −
∑
i 6=k
Si −We, (39)
µe,k ≥ 0, µs,k ≥ 0, We  0, Sk  0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (40)
4Note that if Rank (Xe,k + µe,kI) = N and Rank (Xs,k + µs,kI) = N , then there are (Xe,k + µe,kI)
† =
(Xe,k + µe,kI)
−1
and (Xs,k + µs,kI)
† = (Xs,k + µs,kI)
−1
.
11
where the constraints in (33)∼(37) are derived from (18) and (19).
Next, we will investigate the constraints (33)∼(37) to obtain more insightful solutions. Due
to the fact that
(Xe,k + µe,kI) (Xe,k + µe,kI)
† = Ue,k

 I le,k×le,k 0
0 0(N−le,k)×(N−le,k)

UHe,k,
Eq. (34) can be expressed as
[
I − (Xe,k + µe,kI) (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
]
Xe,kh˜e
=Ue,k

 0le,k×le,k 0
0 I(N−le,k)×(N−le,k)

UHe,kUe,k

 Λle,k×le,ke,k 0
0 Λ
(N−le,k)×(N−le,k)
e,k

UHe,kh˜e
=Ue,k

 0 0
0 Λ
(N−le,k)×(N−le,k)
e,k

UHe,kh˜e = 0, (41)
which says that Λ
(N−le,k)×(N−le,k)
e,k
[
uHe,k,le,k+1, . . . ,u
H
e,k,N
]
h˜e = 0 holds true, where ue,k,i is the
ith column of Ue,k. Similarly, Eq. (36) can be expressed as
[
I − (Xs,k + µs,kI) (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
]
Xs,kh˜k
=Us,k

 0ls,k×ls,k 0
0 I(N−ls,k)×(N−ls,k)

UHs,kUs,k

 Λls,k×ls,ks,k 0
0 Λ
(N−ls,k)×(N−ls,k)
s,k

UHs,kh˜k
=Us,k

 0 0
0 Λ
(N−ls,k)×(N−ls,k)
s,k

UHs,kh˜k = 0, (42)
which implies that Λ
(N−ls,k)×(N−ls,k)
s,k
[
uHs,k,ls,k+1, . . . ,u
H
s,k,N
]
h˜k = 0 holds true, where us,k,i is
the ith column of Us,k.
Due to Xe,k =X
H
e,k, Eq. (35) can be expressed as
h˜HeXe,kh˜e + σ
2
e − µe,kǫ
2
e − h˜
H
eX
H
e,k (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
Xe,kh˜e
=Tr
(
H˜eXe,k
)
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e − Tr
[
H˜eX
H
e,k (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
Xe,k
]
=Tr
{(
H˜eXe,k
) [
I − (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
Xe,k
]}
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e ≥ 0, (43)
12
where H˜e = h˜eh˜
H
e . Similarly, Eq. (37) can be expressed as
h˜HkXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k − h˜
H
kX
H
s,k (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
Xs,kh˜k
=Tr
(
H˜kXs,k
)
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k − Tr
[
H˜kX
H
s,k (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
Xs,k
]
=Tr
{(
H˜kXs,k
) [
I − (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
Xs,k
]}
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≥ 0, (44)
where H˜k = h˜kh˜
H
k .
Theorem 1: When Eq. (1) holds, the optimal solutions of P1−SDR−EQV must satisfy
(a) Rank (W ⋆e ) ≤ 1, where W
⋆
e = w
⋆
ew
⋆H
e = P
⋆
e h˜eh˜
H
e /‖h˜e‖
2 is the optimal AN transmit
covariance that can be derived through the closed-form AN beamforming vector, and P ⋆e
is the power allocated for the AN beamforming;
(b) Rank (S⋆k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, where S
⋆
k = s
⋆
ks
⋆H
k = P
⋆
k h˜kh˜
H
k /‖h˜k‖
2 is the optimal
information transmit covariance that can be derived through the closed-form information
beamforming vectors, and P ⋆k is the power allocated for the kth information beamforming.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 indicates that simultaneous AN- and information-beamforming is the
optimal transmit strategy for P1−SDR−EQV rather than the joint precoding scheme. Thus,
the SDR solutions are indeed optimal for P1.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In Section III, it is shown that the optimal solutions of P1 could be derived by solv-
ing P1−SDR−EQV, where the optimal beamforming vectors are derived in closed-form.
However, the optimal power allocations P ⋆e and {P
⋆
k } remain unknown. Since the optimal
AN-beamforming and information-beamforming vectors are w⋆e =
√
P ⋆e h˜e/‖h˜e‖ and s
⋆
k =√
P ⋆k h˜k/‖h˜k‖, P1 can be simplified to
P2 : min
{µe,k},{µs,k},Pe,{Pk}
Pe +
K∑
k=1
Pk (45)
s.t.
µe,kPe‖h˜e‖2
µe,k + Pe
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e ≥ 0, (46)
µs,kPk‖h˜k‖
2
µs,kγk + Pk
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≥ 0, (47)
µe,k > 0, µs,k > 0, Pe ≥ 0, Pk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (48)
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Define
fe,k(µe,k, Pe) ,
µe,kPe‖h˜e‖
2
µe,k + Pe
, fs,k(µs,k, Pk) ,
µs,kPk‖h˜k‖
2
µs,kγk + pk
, (49)
whose Hessian matrixes are given by
∇2fe,k(µe,k, Pe) =
−2‖h˜e‖2
(µe,k + Pe)3

 P 2e −µe,kPe
−µe,kPe µ2e,k

  0, (50)
∇2fs,k(µs,k, Pk) =
−2γk‖h˜k‖2
(µs,kγk + Pk)3

 P 2k −µs,kPk
−µs,kPk µ
2
s,k

  0, (51)
respectively, which implies that fe,k(µe,k, Pe) and fs,k(µs,k, Pk) are concave functions. Thus, P2
is a convex optimization.
A. Optimal AN Power Allocation
The optimal AN power allocation P ⋆e can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: At the optimal point, the AN power allocation P ⋆e of P2 must satisfy
P ⋆e = 0, (52)
where the corresponding auxiliary variables {µe,k} satisfy µe,k = σ
2
e/ǫ
2
e > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof: Let us show that P ⋆e = 0 from contradiction. Assume {µ
⋆
e,k}, {µ
⋆
s,k}, P
⋆
e and {P
⋆
k }
are the optimal solutions of P2, where P ⋆e > 0 is satisfied. Then we can provide a group of
new solutions:
µ∗e,k =
σ2e
ǫ2e
, µ∗s,k = µ
⋆
s,k, P
∗
e = 0, P
∗
k = P
⋆
k , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (53)
Substituting {µ∗e,k}, {µ
∗
s,k}, P
∗
e and {P
∗
k } into P2, we obtain
P ∗e +
K∑
k=1
P ∗k = 0 +
K∑
k=1
P ⋆k < P
⋆
e +
K∑
k=1
P ⋆k (54)
µ∗e,kP
∗
e ‖h˜e‖
2
µ∗e,k + P
∗
e
+ σ2e − µ
∗
e,kǫ
2
e = 0, (55)
µ∗s,kP
∗
k ‖h˜k‖
2
µ∗s,kγk + P
∗
k
− σ2k − µ
∗
s,kǫ
2
k ≥ 0, (56)
µ∗e,k =
σ2e
ǫ2e
> 0, µ∗s,k = µ
⋆
s,k > 0, P
∗
e = 0, P
∗
k = P
⋆
k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (57)
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From (55)∼(57), we conclude that {µ∗e,k}, {µ
∗
s,k}, P
∗
e and {P
∗
k } satisfy all the constraints of
P2. While we know from (55) that {µ∗e,k}, {µ
∗
s,k}, P
∗
e and {P
∗
k } will always provide smaller
object value, which contradicts the assumption that {µ⋆e,k}, {µ
⋆
s,k}, P
⋆
e and {P
⋆
k } are the optimal
solutions. Thus, at the optimal point there must be P ⋆e = 0.
Theorem 2 says that in order to optimally guarantee the the physical layer security for BDMA
massive MIMO system, one should not adopt the AN beamforming, which is much different
from the conventional MIMO case.
B. Optimal Information Power Allocation
The Lagrange of P2 is defined as
L ({µe,k}, {µs,k}, Pe, {Pk}, {̟k}, {ξk}) = Pe +
K∑
k=1
Pk
−
K∑
k=1
[
̟k
(
µe,kPe‖h˜e‖
2
µe,k + Pe
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e
)]
−
K∑
k=1
[
ξk
(
µs,kPk‖h˜k‖
2
µs,kγk + Pk
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k
)]
, (58)
where {̟k ≥ 0} and {ξk ≥ 0} are the dual variables associated with the constraints (46) and
(47), respectively. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions related to {µe,k} {µs,k}, Pe and
{Pk} can be formulated as ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
∂L
∂µ⋆e,k
= ̟⋆kǫ
2
e −
̟⋆kP
⋆2
e ‖h˜e‖
2
(µ⋆e,k + P
⋆
e )
2
= 0, (59)
∂L
∂µ⋆s,k
= ξ⋆kǫ
2
k −
ξ⋆kP
⋆2
k ‖h˜k‖
2
(µ⋆s,kγk + P
⋆
k )
2
= 0, (60)
∂L
∂P ⋆e
= 1−
K∑
k=1
̟⋆kµ
⋆2
e,k‖h˜e‖
2
(µ⋆e,k + P
⋆
e )
2
= 0, (61)
∂L
∂P ⋆k
= 1−
ξ⋆kµ
⋆2
s,kγk‖h˜k‖
2
(µ⋆s,kγk + P
⋆
k )
2
= 0, (62)
̟⋆k
(
µ⋆e,kP
⋆
e ‖h˜e‖
2
µ⋆e,k + P
⋆
e
+ σ2e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e
)
= 0, (63)
ξ⋆k
(
µ⋆s,kP
⋆
k ‖h˜k‖
2
µ⋆s,kγk + P
⋆
k
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k
)
= 0, (64)
where {µ⋆e,k > 0}, {µ
⋆
s,k > 0}, P
⋆
e ≥ 0 and {P
⋆
k ≥ 0} are the optimal primal variables, {̟
⋆
k ≥ 0}
and {ξ⋆k ≥ 0} are the optimal dual variables.
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Due to {µ⋆s,k > 0} and {P
⋆
k ≥ 0}, it follows from (62) that {ξ
⋆
k > 0} must be satisfied. Then
we know from (64) that
µ⋆s,kP
⋆
k ‖h˜k‖
2
µ⋆s,kγk + P
⋆
k
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (65)
and from (60) that
µ⋆s,k =
P ⋆k ‖h˜k‖ − P
⋆
k ǫk
γkǫk
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (66)
Next, substituting (66) into (62), there holds
ξ⋆k =
γk
(‖h˜k‖ − ǫk)2
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (67)
Lastly, substituting (66) and (67) into (65), we have
P ⋆k =
γkσ
2
k
(‖h˜k‖ − ǫk)2
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (68)
From the above discussions, we know that the optimal solutions of the proposed design P1
could be derived in closed-form, which will significantly reduce the computational complexity
for massive MIMO systems where the number of antennas is huge.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, computer simulations are presented to evaluate the performance of the proposed
SINR-based robust beamforming algorithm for the physical layer security of BDMA massive
MIMO systems. It is assumed that all the legal users and the Eve are equipped with single
antenna, where the received noises per antenna for all users are generated as independent CSCG
random variables distributed with CN (0, 1). For simplicity, the required SINR for all users are
assumed to be the same, i.e., γ = γ1, . . . ,= γK and γe = γe,1, . . . ,= γe,K . Define g = ǫk/‖h˜k‖ =
ǫe/‖h˜e‖ with g ∈ [0, 1). The simulation results are averaged over 10000 Monte Carlo runs.
In the first example, we plot the average SINR of Eve versus the parameter g with K = 30,
N = 128 and γ = 10 dB for the proposed method, the AN 6= 0 method5 and the non-robust
method6 in Fig. 2. Note that the theoretical results in Section IV say that the optimal power
5In this method we assume that the AN beamforming power is set as 0.3
∑K
k=1
P ⋆k and the information beamforming power
is set as 0.7P ⋆k for each legal user. Thus, the power consumption of the AN 6= 0 method is exactly the same as that of the
proposed method.
6Note that for the non-robust method, the estimated channels will be directly assumed as perfect and are used for beamforming.
Thus, the optimal beamforming solutions of P1 for the non-robust method can be easily derived as we = 0 and sk =
γkσ
2
k/‖h˜k‖. The details are omitted here for brevity.
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Fig. 2. Average SINR of Eve versus the parameter g with K = 30 and N = 128.
allocation for AN beamforming should be zero, which implies that the received SINR of Eve is
smaller than γe (please cf. Eq. (8) for details) without using AN. These theoretical results can
be reflected in Fig. 2 where it is clear that the average SINRs of Eve obtained by the proposed
method, the AN 6= 0 method and the non-robust method are smaller than 0 dB when g ≤ 0.7.
This phenomenon implies that the constraint in (8) will be strictly satisfied when we set γe > 0
dB. Based on the results of Fig. 2, we could always choose a small γe, i.e., 0 < γe < 1 to
guarantee that (8) is strictly satisfied for the proposed robust design. Moreover, it is obvious in
Fig. 2 that the average SINRs of Eve derived by the three methods will increase with the increase
of g. This is mainly due to the fact that when g becomes large, i.e., the channel estimation errors
grow large, more power will be received at Eve. Nevertheless, we can assume that g is a small
constant which is reasonable since large channel estimate errors usually lead to unacceptable
degradation in performance. It is seen from Fig. 2 that the average SINR of Eve derived by the
proposed method is always bigger than that of the AN 6= 0 method and the non-robust method.
This phenomenon can be explained by the following simulation results, i.e., the proposed method
will obtain a higher secret sum-rate.
In the second example, we plot the secret sum-rate versus parameter g, N and K, in Fig. 3,
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. Note that the secret sum-rate derived by the proposed method
is always bigger than that of the AN 6= 0 method. Thus, in order to optimally guarantee the
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Fig. 3. Secret sum-rate versus the parameter g with K = 30, N = 128 and γ = 10 dB.
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Fig. 4. Secret sum-rate versus number of transmit antennas N with K = 30, g = 0.5 and γ = 10 dB.
the physical layer security for BDMA massive MIMO system, one should not adopt the AN
beamforming. Moreover, it is clear in Fig. 3 that the secret sum-rate for the non-robust method
will decrease with parameter g increasing. This is mainly due to the fact that the non-robust
method does not take the channel estimation errors into consideration. Thus, with g increasing,
more power will be received at Eve and the secret sum-rate performance will be deteriorated.
Interestingly, the secret sum-rate for the proposed method will increase with the increase of
g when g ≤ 0.3. The reason lies in that when g increases, BS will allocate more power for
information beamforming (please cf. Eq. (68) for details). While the secret sum-rate for the
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Fig. 6. Average minimum transmit power versus g with K = 30, N = 128 and γ = 10 dB.
proposed method will decrease with the increase of g when g > 0.3. This phenomenon can
be explained by Fig. 2 where it says that the average SINR of Eve will also increase with
the increase of g. Thus, the secret sum-rate for the proposed method will decrease when the
increase of SINR of legal users is smaller than that of the Eve. Similarly, it is seen from Fig. 4
and Fig. 5 that the secret sum-rates for the proposed method, the AN 6= 0 method and the
non-robust method will increase with the increase of N and K.
In the last example, we plot the average minimum transmit power versus the parameter g, N
and K in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. Note that the power consumption of the AN
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Fig. 7. Average minimum transmit power versus N with K = 30, g = 0.5 and γ = 10 dB.
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Fig. 8. Average minimum transmit power versus K with N = 128, g = 0.5 and γ = 10 dB.
6= 0 method is exactly the same as that of the proposed method. Thus, the simulation results
of the AN 6= 0 method are not contained in the last example. It is seen from Fig. 6 that the
transmit power for the non-robust method will not change with parameter g. While the transmit
power for the proposed method will increase when g becomes large. This is because when the
channel estimation errors becomes large, the BS will allocate more power to eliminate the CSI
uncertainty. As a result, the proposed method can obtain a higher secret sum-rate than the non-
robust method as in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Moreover, it is clear in Fig. 7 that the transmit
power for both the proposed method and the non-robust method will increase with K increasing,
20
and in Fig. 8 that the transmit power for both the proposed method and the non-robust method
will decrease with the increase of N .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we design simultaneous information and AN beamforming to guarantee the
physical layer security for multiuser BDMA massive MIMO systems. Taking the the channel
estimation errors into consideration, our target is to minimize the transmit power of BS meanwhile
provide the legal users and the Eve with different SINRs. The original problem is NP-hard and op-
timal solutions are generally unavailable in conventional communication systems. Nevertheless, it
is strictly proved that the initial non-convex optimization can be equivalently reformulated as an
SDP, where rank-one solutions are guaranteed in BDMA multiuser massive MIMO systems. More
importantly, the overall global optimal solutions for the original problem are derived in closed-
form, which will greatly reduce the computational complexity. An interesting phenomenon is
that the AN is not useful for multi-user BDMA massive scenario. Simulation results are provided
to corroborate the proposed studies.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
A. Proof of Part (a)
Let us first show that {µ⋆e,k > 0} must hold from contradiction. Assuming µ
⋆
e,k = 0 for some
k that k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it follows from (20) that
Υe,k =

 Xe,k Xe,kh˜e
h˜HeX
H
e,k h˜
H
eXe,kh˜e + σ
2
e

  0 (A.1)
must be satisfied. Then it is obvious in (A.1) that
Xe,k =
∑
i 6=k
Si +We −
1
γe,k
Sk  0, (A.2)
must be satisfied. Moreover, from (20) and (21) , we can obtain
Xs,k = −Xe,k − (
1
γe,k
−
1
γk
)Sk  0, (A.3)
where the last “” holds true due to the fact that Xe,k  0, Sk  0 and γe,k < γk.
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Next, we know from (19) that
h˜HkXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≥ 0, (A.4)
should be strictly satisfied. However, substituting (A.3) into (A.4), we will obtain
0 ≤ h˜HkXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≤ −σ
2
k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≤ −σ
2
k, (A.5)
where the last “≤” is satisfied since µs,k ≥ 0 and ǫ
2
k > 0. Due to the fact that σ
2
k > 0, we know
from (A.5) can not be true. Thus, at the optimal point, µ⋆e,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} must be
satisfied in P1−SDR.
B. Proof of Part (b)
Then, let us show that {µ⋆s,k > 0} must hold from contradiction. Assuming µ
⋆
s,k = 0 for some
k that k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it follows from (21) that
Υs,k =

 Xs,k Xs,kh˜k
h˜HkX
H
s,k h˜
H
kXs,kh˜k − σ
2
k

  0, (A.6)
must be satisfied. Left and right multiplying both sides of Υs,k by [−h˜Hk 1] and [−h˜
H
k 1]
H,
respectively, yields
[−h˜Hk 1]Υs,k[−h˜
H
k 1]
H = −σ2k ≥ 0, (A.7)
which cannot be true due to σ2k > 0. Thus, at the optimal point, µ
⋆
s,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
must be satisfied in P1−SDR.
The proof is thus completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
A. Proof of Part (a)
Let us show that Rank
(
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} from contradiction. Assume
Rank
(
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)
= 0 or X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI = 0 at the optimal point, for some k that ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , K}. It is known from (21) that X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI can be re-expressed as
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI = µ
⋆
e,kI +
∑
i 6=k
S⋆i +W
⋆
e −
1
γe,k
S⋆k = 0. (B.1)
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From Proposition 1, we know that µ⋆e,k > 0 is strictly satisfied at the optimal point. Moreover,
due to the fact that {S⋆k  0} and W
⋆
e  0, there must be
Rank
(
µ⋆e,kI +
∑
i 6=k
S⋆i +W
⋆
e
)
= N, (B.2)
which says that µ⋆e,kI +
∑
i 6=k
S⋆i +W
⋆
e ≻ 0. Then from (B.1) and (B.2) we know that when
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI = 0, there must be S
⋆
k ≻ 0 or Rank (S
⋆
k) = N .
Define N ×N matrix Q as
Q =
[
h˜e
‖h˜e‖
,
h˜1
‖h˜1‖
, . . . ,
h˜K
‖h˜K‖
, τ1, . . . , τN−K−1
]
, (B.3)
where τN×1i , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N −K − 1} is a unit vector, i.e., ‖τi‖ = 1 which is constrained to
satisfy the following properties:
(a) τi ⊥ τj , ∀i 6= j;
(b) τi ⊥ h˜e, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N −K − 1};
(c) τi ⊥ h˜k, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N −K − 1}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Thanks to (1) under BDMA massive MIMO scheme, we know that the defined matrix Q is
consisted of N orthogonal bases. Thus, Q is invertible, i.e., Q−1 exists. Consequently, there
must be
Rank (QW ⋆e ) = Rank (W
⋆
e ) , (B.4)
Rank (QS⋆k) = Rank (S
⋆
k) , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (B.5)
From (B.3), (B.4) and (B.5), we know thatW ⋆e and S
⋆
k , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} can be further expressed
as
W ⋆e = P
⋆
we,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆we,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
+
N−K−1∑
i=1
P ⋆we,τiτiτ
H
i , (B.6)
S⋆k = P
⋆
sk,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆sk,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
+
N−K−1∑
i=1
P ⋆sk,τiτiτ
H
i , (B.7)
where P ⋆we,he ≥ 0, {P
⋆
we,hi
≥ 0}, {P ⋆we,τi ≥ 0}, P
⋆
sk,he
≥ 0, {P ⋆sk,hi ≥ 0} and {P
⋆
sk,τi
≥ 0}. Note
that if Rank (S⋆k) = N , then there must be P
⋆
sk,he
> 0, {P ⋆sk,hi > 0} and {P
⋆
sk,τi
> 0}. Under the
previous assumption, there is at least one S⋆k that satisfies Rank (S
⋆
k) = N , where P
⋆
sk,he
> 0,
{P ⋆sk,hi > 0} and {P
⋆
sk,τi
> 0} must hold.
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Then, letting {P ⋆we,τi = 0}, {P
⋆
sk,τi
= 0}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N −K − 1}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we can
construct the following new solutions

W ∗e = P
⋆
we,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆we,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
,
S∗k = P
⋆
sk,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆sk,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
.
(B.8)
Substituting (B.8) into P1−SDR and using the properties of (B.3), we obtain
Tr(W ⋆e ) +
K∑
k=1
Tr(S⋆k) > Tr(W
∗
e ) +
K∑
k=1
Tr(S∗k) (B.9)
 X∗e,k + µ⋆e,kI X∗e,kh˜e
h˜HeX
∗H
e,k h˜
H
eX
∗
e,kh˜e + σ
2
e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e

  0, (B.10)

 X∗s,k + µ⋆s,kI X∗s,kh˜k
h˜HkX
∗H
s,k h˜
H
kX
∗
s,kh˜k − σ
2
k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k

  0, (B.11)
X∗e,k =
∑
i 6=k
S∗i +W
∗
e −
1
γe,k
S∗k , (B.12)
X∗s,k =
1
γk
S∗k −
∑
i 6=k
S∗i −W
∗
e , (B.13)
µ⋆e,k ≥ 0, µ
⋆
s,k ≥ 0, W
∗
e  0, S
∗
k  0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (B.14)
From (B.10)∼(B.14) we know that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} satisfy all constraints of P1−SDR. From
(B.9) we know that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} will always provide smaller objective value. Consequently,
W ∗e and {S
∗
k} are better solutions thanW
⋆
e and {S
⋆
k}, which contradicts with our first place as-
sumption. Thus, there must be Rank (S⋆k) < N and Rank
(
X⋆e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
B. Proof of Part (b)
Let us show that Rank
(
X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} from contradiction. Assume
Rank
(
X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)
= 0 or X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI = 0 at the optimal point, for some k that ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , K}. Due to the fact that µ⋆s,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} (please cf. Proposition 1 for details),
there must be
X⋆k = −µ
⋆
s,kI  0. (B.15)
24
Then substituting (B.15) into (19), it is easily known that
 0 X⋆s,kh˜k
h˜HkX
⋆H
s,k h˜
H
k (−µ
⋆
s,kI)h˜k − σ
2
k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k

  0, (B.16)
must be strictly satisfied. which cannot be true due to the fact that h˜Hk (−µ
⋆
s,kI)h˜k−σ
2
k−µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k <
0. Thus there must be Rank
(
X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)
≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
The proof of Proposition 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The following lemma is useful in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 3 (Theory of Majorization [33]): Let A and B be two N ×N positive semi-definite
matrices with eigenvalues α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αN and β1 ≥ . . . ≥ βN , respectively. Then there holds
N∑
i=1
αiβN−i+1 ≤ Tr(AB) ≤
N∑
i=1
αiβi. (C.1)
Firstly, it follows from (B.8) that at the optimal point, W ⋆e and {S
⋆
k} can be expressed as

W ⋆e = P
⋆
we,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆we,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
,
S⋆k = P
⋆
sk,he
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆sk,hi
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
,
(C.2)
where P ⋆we,he ≥ 0 and {P
⋆
we,hi
≥ 0} are the coefficients ofW ⋆e , while P
⋆
sk,he
≥ 0 and {P ⋆sk,hi ≥ 0}
are the coefficients of S⋆k. Then using (C.2), X
⋆
e,k and X
⋆
s,k can be expressed as
X⋆e,k =
∑
i 6=k
S⋆i +W
⋆
e −
1
γe,k
S⋆k (C.3)
=
(∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he
)
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
j=1
(∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hj + P
⋆
we,hj
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,hj
)
h˜jh˜
H
j
‖h˜j‖2
,
X⋆s,k =
1
γk
S⋆k −
∑
i 6=k
S⋆i −W
⋆
e (C.4)
=
(
1
γk
P ⋆sk,he −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he − P
⋆
we,he
)
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
+
K∑
j=1
(
1
γk
P ⋆sk,hj −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hj − P
⋆
we,hj
)
h˜jh˜
H
j
‖h˜j‖2
.
With the BDMA massive MIMO regime, the estimated channel vectors satisfy h˜i ⊥ h˜k ⊥
h˜e, ∀i 6= k. Thus, we know from (C.2)∼(C.4) that h˜e/‖h˜e‖, h˜1/‖h˜1‖, . . . , h˜K/‖h˜K‖ ∈ {ue,k,i}
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and h˜e/‖h˜e‖, h˜1/‖h˜1‖, . . . , h˜K/‖h˜K‖ ∈ {us,k,i}, where ue,k,i and us,k,i are the ith column of
Ue,k and Us,k respectively. Based on the above discussions, we know from (41) that:
(a) If h˜e/‖h˜e‖ lies in the null space ofX⋆e,k+µ
⋆
e,kI , i.e., h˜e/‖h˜e‖ = ue,k,i and le,k+1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
there holds ∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he + µ
⋆
e,k = 0; (C.5)
(b) If h˜e/‖h˜e‖ lies in the range space of X⋆e,k+µ
⋆
e,kI , i.e., h˜e/‖h˜e‖ = ue,k,i and 1 ≤ i ≤ le,k,
there holds ∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he + µ
⋆
e,k > 0. (C.6)
Similarly, we know from (42) that
(a) If h˜k/‖h˜k‖ lies in the null space ofX⋆s,k+µ
⋆
s,kI i.e., h˜k/‖h˜k‖ = us,k,i and ls,k+1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
there holds
1
γk
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
+ µ⋆s,k = 0; (C.7)
(b) If h˜k/‖h˜k‖ lies in the range space of X⋆s,k+µ
⋆
s,kI , i.e., h˜k/‖h˜k‖ = us,k,i and 1 ≤ i ≤ ls,k,
there holds
1
γk
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
+ µ⋆s,k > 0. (C.8)
Next, let the EVD of H˜e be H˜e = Uh˜,eΛh˜,eU
H
h˜,e
, where Λh˜,e is diagonal with the eigenvalues
λe,1 ≥ . . . ≥ λe,N . Since H˜e = h˜eh˜He has only one nonzero eigenvalue, there must be λe,1 > 0,
λe,2 = . . . = λe,N = 0 and uh˜,e,1 = h˜e/‖h˜e‖, where uh˜,e,1 is the first column of Uh˜,e. Then
according to (41) and Lemma 3, we know that (43) can be further reformulated as
0 ≤ Tr
{(
H˜eXe,k
) [
I − (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
Xe,k
]}
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e
=Tr
{(
H˜e,kXe,k
) [
I − (Xe,k + µe,kI)
† (Xe,k + µe,kI − µe,kI)
]}
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e
=µe,kTr
[
H˜eXe,k (Xe,k + µe,kI)
†
]
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e
=µe,kTr

Λe,k

 Σ−1e,k,+ 0
0 0

UHe,kUh˜,eΛh˜,eUHh˜,eUe,k

+ σ2e − µe,kǫ2e
=
µe,kqe,k,iλe,1
µe,k + qe,k,i
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e ≤
µe,kqe,k,1λe,1
µe,k + qe,k,1
+ σ2e − µe,kǫ
2
e, (C.9)
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where qe,k,i is the ith eigenvalue of Xe,k whose corresponding eigenvector is ue,k,i = uh˜,e,1 =
h˜e/‖h˜e‖, and qe,k,1 is the maximum eigenvalue of Xe,k. Note that in (C.9), the last “≤” holds
with “=” when ue,k,1 = uh˜,e,1 = h˜e/‖h˜e‖.
Similarly, let the EVD of H˜k be H˜k = Uh˜,kΛh˜,kU
H
h˜,k
where Λh˜,k is diagonal with the single
non-zero eigenvalue λk,1 > 0 and the first column of Uh˜,k is uh˜,k,1 = h˜k/‖h˜k‖. According to
(42) and Lemma A, we know that (44) can be reformulated as (the details are omitted here for
brevity)
Tr
{(
H˜kXs,k
) [
I − (Xs,k + µs,kI)
†
Xs,k
]}
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k
=
µs,kqs,k,iλk,1
µs,k + qs,k,i
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k ≤
µs,kqs,k,1λk,1
µs,k + qs,k,1
− σ2k − µs,kǫ
2
k, (C.10)
where qs,k,i is the ith eigenvalue of Xs,k whose corresponding eigenvector is us,k,i = uh˜,k,1 =
h˜k/‖h˜k‖, and qs,k,1 is the maximum eigenvalue of Xs,k. Note that in (C.10), the last “≤” holds
with “=” when us,k,1 = uh˜,k,1 = h˜k/‖h˜k‖, where us,k,1, uh˜,k,1 are the first columns of Us,k and
Uh˜,k respectively.
Lastly, let us show that Rank (W ⋆e ) ≤ 1 and Rank (S
⋆
k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} from contra-
diction. Assume {µ⋆e,k}, {µ
⋆
s,k}, W
⋆
e and {S
⋆
k} are the optimal solutions of P1−SDR−EQV,
where Rank (W ⋆e ) = Ce > 1 or Rank (S
⋆
k) = Ck > 1. Then we provide the following new
solutions
W ∗e =
(
P ⋆we,he +
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he
)
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
, S∗k =
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
)
h˜kh˜
H
k
‖h˜k‖2
, (C.11)
which satisfies Rank (W ∗e ) ≤ 1 and Rank (S
∗
k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then it is obvious that
X∗e,k and X
∗
s,k can be expressed as
X∗e,k =
∑
i 6=k
S∗i +W
∗
e −
1
γe,k
S∗k =
∑
i 6=k
(
P ⋆si,hi −
∑
j 6=i
P ⋆sj ,hi − P
⋆
we,hi
)
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
+
(
P ⋆we,he +
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he
)
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
−
1
γe,k
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
)
h˜kh˜
H
k
‖h˜k‖2
, (C.12)
X∗s,k =
1
γk
S∗k −
∑
i 6=k
S∗i −W
∗
e =
1
γk
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
)
h˜kh˜
H
k
‖h˜k‖2
−
∑
i 6=k
(
P ⋆si,hi −
∑
j 6=i
P ⋆sj ,hi − P
⋆
we,hi
)
h˜ih˜
H
i
‖h˜i‖2
−
(
P ⋆we,he +
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he
)
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
, (C.13)
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respectively. From (C.3) and (C.12), we know∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he ≤ P
⋆
we,he
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he, (C.14)
which implies that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} will not violate the constraints in (34) of P1−SDR−EQV
(please cf. Eq. (C.5) and Eq. (C.6) for details). From (C.4) and (C.13), we obtain
1
γk
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
≤
1
γk
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
)
, (C.15)
which implies that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} will not violate the constraints in (36) of P1−SDR−EQV
(please cf. Eq. (C.7) and Eq. (C.8) for details). Moreover, it is easily known from (C.3), (C.4),
(C.12) and (C.13) that if µ⋆s,k −
(
P ⋆we,he +
∑K
i=1 P
⋆
si,he
)
≥ 0, there must hold X∗e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI  0
and X∗s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI  0. Interestingly, it is observed from (C.9) that we can always let qe,k,1 =
P ⋆we,he +
∑K
i=1 P
⋆
si,he
= 0 and µe,k = σ
2
e/ǫ
2
e, which will not violate (C.9). A more rigorous proof
can be found in Theorem 2.
As a result, substituting W ∗e and {S
∗
k} into P1−SDR−EQV, we obtain from (32) that
Tr(W ∗e )+
K∑
k=1
Tr(S∗k)=P
⋆
we,he
+
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he +
K∑
k=1
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,hk − P
⋆
we,hk
)
≤P ⋆we,he +
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,he +
K∑
k=1
P ⋆sk,hk +
K∑
j=1
K∑
i=1
P ⋆si,hj =Tr(W
⋆
e )+
K∑
k=1
Tr(S⋆k); (C.16)
from (33) and (34) that
X∗e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI  0, X
∗
s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI  0; (C.17)[
I −
(
X∗e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
) (
X∗e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)†]
X∗e,kh˜e = 0; (C.18)
from (35) that
Tr
{(
H˜eX
∗
e,k
) [
I −
(
X∗e,k + µ
⋆
e,kI
)†
X∗e,k
]}
+ σ2e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e
=
µe,k
(
P ⋆we,he +
∑K
i=1 P
⋆
si,he
)
λe,1
µe,k + P
⋆
we,he
+
∑K
i=1 P
⋆
si,he
+ σ2e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e
≥
µe,k
(∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he
)
λe,1
µe,k +
∑
i 6=k
P ⋆si,he + P
⋆
we,he
−
1
γe,k
P ⋆sk,he
+ σ2e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e
=Tr
{(
H˜eX
⋆
e,k
) [
I −
(
X⋆e,k + µe,kI
)†
X⋆e,k
]}
+ σ2e − µ
⋆
e,kǫ
2
e > 0; (C.19)
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from (36) that [
I −
(
X∗s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
) (
X∗s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)†]
X∗s,kh˜k = 0; (C.20)
from (37) that
Tr
{(
H˜kX
∗
s,k
) [
I −
(
X∗s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)†
X∗s,k
]}
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k
=
µ⋆s,k
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k P
⋆
si,hk
− P ⋆we,hk
)
/γkλk,1
µ⋆s,k +
(
P ⋆sk,hk −
∑
i 6=k P
⋆
si,hk
− P ⋆we,hk
)
/γk
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k
≥
µ⋆s,k
(
P ⋆sk,hk/γk −
∑
i 6=k P
⋆
si,hk
− P ⋆we,hk
)
λk,1
µ⋆s,k + P
⋆
sk,hk
/γk −
∑
i 6=k P
⋆
si,hk
− P ⋆we,hk
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k
=Tr
{(
H˜kX
⋆
s,k
) [
I −
(
X⋆s,k + µ
⋆
s,kI
)†
X⋆s,k
]}
− σ2k − µ
⋆
s,kǫ
2
k > 0; (C.21)
from (38), (39) and (40) that
X∗e,k =
∑
i 6=k
S∗i +W
∗
e −
1
γe,k
S∗k , X
∗
s,k =
1
γk
S∗k −
∑
i 6=k
S∗i −W
∗
e ; (C.22)
µ⋆e,k ≥ 0, µ
⋆
s,k ≥ 0, W
∗
e  0, S
∗
k  0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (C.23)
Then it can be inferred from (C.16)∼(C.23) that
(a) If Rank (W ⋆e ) = Ce > 1, we know from (C.2) that there exists at least one P
⋆
we,hi
>
0, i ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Thus, from (C.16)∼(C.20), (C.22) and (C.23) we know that W ∗e and
{S∗k} will not change the object value (32) and always satisfy constraints (33)∼(36) and
(38)∼(40). While from (C.21) we know that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} will always provide more
freedoms. Thus, W ∗e and {S
∗
k} are better solutions than W
⋆
e and {S
⋆
k}.
(b) If Rank (S⋆k) = Ck > 1, we know from (C.2) that there exists at least one P
⋆
sk,hi6=k
>
0, i ∈ {1, . . . , K} or P ⋆sk,he > 0. Then, if P
⋆
sk,hi6=k
> 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we know from
(C.16) thatW ∗e and {S
∗
k} will always provide smaller objective value thanW
⋆
e and {S
⋆
k}.
While from (C.17)∼(C.23), we know that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} satisfy all the constraints of
P1−SDR−EQV. Thus, W ∗e and {S
∗
k} are better solutions. If P
⋆
sk,he
> 0, we know
from (C.16)∼(C.18) and (C.20)∼(C.23) that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} will not change the object
value (32) and always satisfy constraints (33), (34) and (36)∼(40). While from (C.19) we
conclude thatW ∗e and {S
∗
k} will always provide more freedoms. Thus,W
∗
e and {S
∗
k} are
better solutions than W ⋆e and {S
⋆
k}.
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Based on the above discussions, we know that W ∗e and {S
∗
k} are always better solutions,
which contradicts the assumption that W ⋆e and {S
⋆
k} are optimal solutions. Thus there must
be Rank (W ⋆e ) ≤ 1 and Rank (S
⋆
k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. From (C.11), we know W
⋆
e and
{S⋆k} can be further expressed as
W ∗e = P
⋆
we
h˜eh˜
H
e
‖h˜e‖2
, S∗k = P
⋆
sk
h˜kh˜
H
k
‖h˜k‖2
, (C.24)
where P ⋆we and P
⋆
sk
are the optimal power allocation for AN beamforming and information
beamforming, respectively. The proof of Theorem 1 is thus completed.
REFERENCES
[1] T. L. Marzetta, “Noncooperative cellular wireless with unlimited nnumbers of base station antennas,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 3590–3600, Nov. 2010.
[2] J. G. Andrews, S. Buzzi, W. Choi, S. V. Hanly, A. Lozano, A. C. Soong, and J. C. Zhang, “What will 5G be?” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1065–1082, Jun. 2014.
[3] E. G. Larsson, O. Edfors, F. Tufvesson and T. L. Marzetta, “Massive MIMO for next generation wireless systems,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 186–195, Feb. 2014.
[4] L. Lu, G. Y. Li, A. L. Swindlehurst, A. Ashikhmin and R. Zhang, “An overview of massive MIMO: Benefits and challenges,”
IEEE J. Sel Topics Signal Process., vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 742–758, Oct. 2014.
[5] H. Yin, D. Gesbert, M. Filippou, and Y. Liu, “A coordinated approach to channel estimation in large-scale multiple-antenna
systems,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 264–273, Feb. 2013.
[6] A. Adhikary, J. Nam, J.-Y. Ahn, and G. Caire, “Joint spatial division and multiplexing the large scale array regime,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 6441–6463, Oct. 2013.
[7] H. Xie, B. Wang, F. Gao, S. Jin, “A full-space spectrum-sharing strategy for massive MIMO cognitive radio systems,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 10, pp. 2537-2549, Oct. 2016.
[8] H. Xie, F. Gao, S. Jin, “An overview of low-rank channel estimation for massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Access, vol. 4,
pp. 7313–7321, Nov. 2
[9] H. Xie, F. Gao, S. Zhang, S. Jin, “A unified transmission strategy for TDD/FDD massive MIMO systems with spatial basis
expansion model,” to appear in IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., early access available online, 2016.
[10] W. Choi, A. Forenza, J. G. Andrews, and J. R. W. Heath, “Opportunistic space-division multiple access with beam selection,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 55, no. 12, pp. 2371–2380, Dec. 2007.
[11] C. Sun, X. Gao, S. Jin, M. Matthaiou, Z. Ding and C. Xiao, “Beam division multiple access transmission for massive
MIMO communications,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 2170-2184, June 2015.
[12] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[13] I. Csiszar and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–
348, May 1978.
30
[14] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54,
no. 6, pp. 2470–2492, June 2008.
[15] Y. Liang and H. V. Poor, “Generalized multiple access channels with confidential messages,” in Proc. IEEE ISIT, Seattle,
WA, USA, July 2006, pp. 952–956.
[16] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8,
pp. 4961–4972, Aug. 2011.
[17] J. Zhu, R. Schober, and V. K. Bhargava, “Secure transmission in multicell massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 4766–4781, Sep. 2014.
[18] X. Chen, L. Lei, H. Zhang, and C. Yuen, “Large-scale MIMO relaying techniques for physical layer security: AF or DF?”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 5135C5146, Sep. 2015.
[19] J. Wang, J. Lee, F. Wang and T. Q. S. Quek, “Jamming-aided secure communication in massive MIMO rician channels,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 12, pp. 6854–6868, Dec. 2015.
[20] H. M. Wang, T. X. Zheng, J. Yuan, D. Towsley, and M. H. Lee, “Physical layer security in heterogeneous cellular networks,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1204–1219, Mar. 2016.
[21] J. Zhu, R. Schober, and V. K. Bhargava, “Linear precoding of data and artificial noise in secure massive MIMO systems,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 2245–2261, Mar. 2016.
[22] Y. Wu, R. Schober, D. W. K. Ng, C. Xiao and G. Caire, “Secure massive MIMO transmission with an active eavesdropper,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3880–3900, July 2016.
[23] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[24] X. Li, T. Jiang, S. Cui, J. An, and Q. Zhang, “Cooperative communications based on rateless network coding in distributed
MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 60–67, June 2010.
[25] Y. Rong, S. A. Vorobyov and A. B. Gershman, “Robust linear receivers for multiaccess space-time block-coded MIMO
systems: A probabilistically constrained approach,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 1560–1570, Aug.
2006.
[26] J. Wang and D. P. Palomar, “Worst-Case Robust MIMO Transmission With Imperfect Channel Knowledge,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 3086–3100, Aug. 2009.
[27] N. Vucic and H. Boche, “Robust QoS-Constrained Optimization of Downlink Multiuser MISO Systems,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 714–725, Feb. 2009.
[28] A. Mostafa and L. Lampe, “Optimal and robust beamforming for secure transmission in MISO visible-light communication
links,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 64, no. 24, pp. 6501–6516, Dec. 2016.
[29] S. Boyd, L. E. Ghaoui, E. Feron, and V. Balakrishnan, Linear Matrix Inequalities in System and Control Theory.
Philadelphia, PA: SIAM Studies in Applied Mathematics, 1994.
[30] Z. Q. Luo, W. K. Ma, A. M. C. So, Y. Ye, and S. Zhang, “Semidefinite relaxation of quadratic optimization problems,”
IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 20–34, May 2010.
[31] R. Penrose, “A generalized inverse for matrices,” in Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc., 1955, vol. 51, pp. 406–413.
[32] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
[33] A. W. Marshall and I. Olkin, Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications. New York: Academic, 1979.
